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Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality of Money
ABSTRACT
Rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in
nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks. And, by themselves, snail
frictions in nominal adjustment, such as costs of changing, prices, create only
small non—neutralities.But this paper shows that substantial nominal
rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal
frictions. The paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity
given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for several
specific sources of real rigidity: costs of adjusting real prices, asymmetric
demand arising front imperfect information, and efficiency wages.
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Cambridge, MA 02138I. INTRODUCTION
According to Keynesian economics, nominal wages and prices are rigid, and
so nominaldisturbances have real effects. Researchers have presented a wide
rangeof explanations for wage and price rigidities; examples include implicit
contracts, customer markets, social custoiii.s, efficiency wages,
insider/outsider models, inventory models, and theories of countercyclical
markups under imperfect competition.1 These explanations have a common weak-
ness, however: they are theories of real rather than nominal rigidities. That
is, they attempt to explain why real wages or prices are unresponsive to
changes in economic activity. Real rigidity does not imply nominal rigidity:
without an independent source of nominal stickiness, prices adjust fully to
nominal shocks regardless of the extent of real rigidities.
The purpose of this paper is to show that real rigidities nonetheless
have a crucial role in explaining nominal rigidities and the non-neutrality of
nominal shocks.While real rigidities alone are not sufficient, nominal
rigidities can be explained by a combination of real rigidities and small
frictions in nominal adjustment.
'For implicit contracts, see for example Azariadis (1975) and Baily (19711);
for customer markets, Okun (1982); for social customs, Akerlof (1980) and
Boner (1981!); for efficiency wages, Solow (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
and Bulow and Summers (1986); for insider/outsider models, Lindbeck and Snower
(1986); for inventories, Blinder (1982); and for countercyclical markups,
Stiglitz (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), and Bils (1986, 1987).2
Real rigidities are important because nominal frictions alone ——like
real rigidities alone --arenot enough to cause a large amount of nominal
rigidity.In practice, the costs of making nominal prices and wages more
flexible-—forexample, by adjusting prices more frequently or adopting
greaterindexation——appearsmall. Recent research shows that in principle
the nominal rigidities caused by small costs of flexibility can be large
(Mankiw, 1985; Blanchard and ICiyotaki, 1987; Ball and Romer, 1987a). In these
models, however, small frictions have large effects only for very implausible
parameter values; for example, labor supply must be highly elastic.For
plausible parameter values, nominal rigidity has large private costs.As a
result, firms and workers choose only a small degree of rigidity, and nominal
shocks have only small real effects.
We reverse these results by adding real rigidities to a model with a cost
of changing nominal prices.Both the degree of nominal rigidity caused by
this friction and the resulting welfare loss are increasing in the degree of
real rigidity. Substantial real rigidity implies a large amount of nominal
rigidity even if the cost of changing prices is small.2'3
The intuition behind these results is the following. Rigidity of prices
after a nominal shock is a Nash equilibrium if the gain to a firm from chang—
2Akerlof and Yellen (1985) show that nominal rigidity can result from "near—
rational" behavior rather than costs of adjusting prices. Our central point
carries over to their model: a greater degree of real rigidity implies that a
greater degree of nominal rigidity can arise from a given departure from full
rationality.
3Blanciard (1987a, b) also argues that real rigidities increase the real ef-
fects of nominal disturbances.3
ingits nominal price, given that other nominal prices are unchanged, is less
than the cost of changing prices. But a change in one firm's nominal price
when other nominal prices are fixed is a change in the firm's real price.
Further, if other prices do not change, then the nominal shock affects real
aggregate demand. Thus nominal rigidity is an equilibrium if a firm's gain
from adjusting its real price in response to the change in real aggregate
demand is less than the cost of changing prices. If the firm desires only a
small change in its real price -—thatis, if there is a large degree of real
rigidity ——thenthe gain from making the change is small.Since real
rigidity reduces the gain from adjustment, it increases the range of nominal
shocksfor whichnon-adjustment is an equilibrium.
Theremainder of the paper consists of six sections. Since our point is
not tied to any specificsource of real rigidity, Section II studies a quite
general model.In this model, imperfectly competitive price setters face a
small cost of changing prices --a"menu cost." We show that the degree of
nominal rigidity is increasing in the degree of real rigidityunder broad con-
ditions.
Section III shows that nominal frictions alone are not sufficient for
large non-neutralities. We present a specific example of the general model of
Section II in which imperfect competition and the menu cost are the only
departures from Walrasian assumptions. We show that for plausibleparameter
values the model implies only small nominal rigidities.
The following three sections illustrate the general relation between real
and nominal rigidity. Ineach case, we add a specific source of real rigidity4
to the model of Section III and show that large non—neutralitiescan result.
Section IV presents our simplest example, in which we add an ad hoc cost of
adjusting real prices to the small fixed cost of adjusting nominal prices.
Section V presents a model in which the real rigidities have firm
microeconomic foundations.Specifically, we combine our basic model with a
model of imperfect information and customer markets based on Stiglitz (1979,
1984) and Woglom (1982). Real rigidity arises from an asymmetry in the demand
curve facing a seller. Finally, Section VI considers real wage rigidity that
arises when firms pay efficiency wages. This example is motivated by the com-
mon belief that the labor market is an important source of real rigidities.
Section VII offers concluding remarks.
II. GENERAL RESULTS
A.Assumptions and Overview
Consider an economy consisting
of a large number of price-settingagents.
We assume that agenti's utility depends on aggregate
real spending in the
economy, I, and onthe agent's relative price,
p/P.4 In addition, there is a
small cost, z, of changingnominal prices -—themenu cost. Thus agenti's
utility is given by
(1) Ui W(Y,—f)- ZDi
P
4Our general results do
not depend on particular
definitions of I andthe
price level P(that is, they do
not depend on how weaggregate overagents).
Our only assumption
below is that ifall agents (or,
since the economyis
large, allbut one) choosethe sameprice,
then P equals this price.5
where Di is a dummy variable that indicates whether theagent changes his
nominal price. In the specific models of latersections, an agent is usually
a "yeoman farmer" who sells a differentiated good that heproduces with his
own labor.We also, however, consider the case in which farmers hireeach
other in a labor market.Finally, it is straightforward to extend our
analysis to the case in which (1) is the profit function of animperfectly
competitivefirm (the model is closed by assuming that firmsare owned by
households).Under all these interpretations, Yaffects an agent's utility
(orprofits) by shifting out the demand curve that he faces —-greaterag-
gregatedemand implies that the agent's sales are higher at agiven relative
price. "1 affects utility by determining the point on the demandcurve at
which the agent produces.
To make nominaldisturbances possible, we introduce money. Assume thata
transactionstechnologydetermines the relation between aggregate spending and
real money balances:
(2) Y





5Thepurpose of (2) is not to advance a particular theory of money but
simply to introduce a downward-sloping aggregate demand curve --anegative relation between Y andP. Our results would not change if, following Blanchard
and Kiyotaki, we introduced money by adding real balances toutility. In ad-
dition, while we assume below that fluctuations in aggregate demand arise from
fluctuations in money, it would be straightforward to introducevelocity
shocks instead.6
We assume that in the absence of menu costs, there is a symmetric equi-
librium in prices 1 Vi) for a unique level of M/P. We normalize this
level to be one; in other words, we assume that W2(1,1):O (subscripts denote
partial derivatives). We also assume that W22(i,1)cO (price setters' second
order condition) and that W12>O (which guarantees stability of the
equilibrium).
Part B of this section derives the degree of real price rigidity. We
measure real rigidity by the responsiveness of agents' desired real prices,
neglecting the menu cost, to shifts in real aggregate demand. Part C derives
the degree of nominal rigidity, defined by the largest monetary shock to which
prices do not adjust.Under broad (although not universal) conditions,
changesin W() that raise the degree of real rigidity lead to greater
nominal rigidity as well.Finally, Part D computes the welfare loss from
equilibriumnominal rigidity and shows that it also usually increases with
real rigidity. Thus real rigidities bolster the Keynesian view that economic
fluctuations resulting from nominal shocks are highly inefficient.
B. Real Rigidity
* Let be agent i's utility-maxinizing real price in the absence of
menu costs. This price is defined by the first order condition




where henceforth we evaluate all derivatives at (1,1), the equilibrium in the
absence of menu costs. We define a high degree of real rigidity as a small
value of iT-- asmall response of an agent's desired price to changes in real7
money, which shift aggregatedemand.
Equation(II) shows that a high degreeof real rigiditycanresultfrom a
large value of -W22 or a small value of W12. Intuitively,when —W22 is large
——thatis, when utility is very concave in an agent'srelative price -—
changesin the price are very costly. When W12 is small, shiftsin real money
have little effect on W2, which determines the desired price.Of the specific
sources of real rigidity that we consider in latersections, two raise -W22
and one lowers W12. -
C.The EQuilibrium Degree of Nominal Rigidity
We measure nominal rigidity through the following experiment.Assume
that 14 is random. The distribution of 14 is continuous, symmetricaround one,
increasing for }K1, and decreasing for 1*1. All agentsknow the distribution.
Eachagentsets a nominal price before 14 is realized and then, after observing
14,has theoption of paying the menu costz and adjustinghis price. We solve
forthe range of realizations of N for whichnon—adjustment of all prices is
anequilibrium. This range is symmetric around one,(1_x*, 1+x*); x is our
measure of nominal rigidity. We show that a broadclass of changes in W()
that increase real rigidity raise as well. The derivation of is similar
to calculations in Ball and Romer (1987a, b), and so here we simplysketch the
analysis.
A preliminary step is to determine the price, o'thatagents set before
they observe the money supply. This is the aggregateprice level if agents do
not adjust ex post ——thatis, if the money supply falls within (1-x,1+x*).
One can show that P can be approximated by8
(5) -t=I—
wherewe again evaluate derivatives at (1,1), and where (x*) is thevariance
of K conditional on Me(1_x*,1+x*). Although P=M whenprices are flexible, P0
differs from one, the mean of H, ifW21110 ——certaintyequivalence fails if
utility is not quadratic.
We now determine when non—adjustment of prices after K isrealized is a
Nash equilibrium. We do so by comparing an agent'sutility if he adjusts his
price and if he does not, given that no other agent adjusts. Ifagent I main-
tains a rigid price of P along with the others, thenDi:O, H/P =M/P0,and
=1.Thus the agent's utility is W(±!, 1). If the agentadjusts despite
P0
others' non-adjustment, then Din. Since one agent's behaviordoes not affect
the aggregate price level, H/P is stillH/P0. Finally, the agent sets P1/P
equal to theutility-maximizing level given H/P.Thus the agent's
H
utility is W(—, —)— z.
P





PC=W(—,—)— W(—,1) POP P0
PCis the "private cost" of nominal rigidity: agent i's lossfrom not setting
his relative price at the utility—maximizing level.According to (6),
rigidity is an equilibrium if this loss is less than themenu cost.Ap-




where xM—1. Equations (6) and (7) imply that rigidityis an equilibrium when
**
Hlies within (1-x ,1+x ), where
(8)x
We can now show the connection between real andnominal rigidity. Using
the fact that yr-1121/1122, we can rewrite (8) as
(9) x
VT12W22
Ifthere is no nominal friction, then nominal prices arecompletely flexible
regardless of the degree of real rigidity:x*EO if zz0. But for a positive
menu cost, increasing real rigiditywhile holding constant W22 ——thatis,
decreasing itbydecreasing W12 --leadsto greater nominal rigidity.As it
approacheszero, the degree of nominal rigiditybecomes arbitrarily large.
Alternatively, using the definition of iv we canrewrite (8) as
(10)x =
ViiW12
Accordingto (10), increasing real rigidity while holdingconstant W12 --that
is, lowering ivbyincreasing -W22 -—alsoincreases nominal rigidity.
Thus an increase in real rigidity --afall in -W121W22 --causedby ei-
ther a reduction in or an increase in —W22 leads to greaternominal
rigidity. Because the degree of nominal rigiditydepends on more than the de-
gree of real rigidity, one canconstruct examples in which changing a
parameterincreases real rigidity but lowersx. Specifically, this canoccur
ifthechange raises 12 and also raises -W22bya greater amount. But this
isnot a natural case. As we show in the specificmodels of later sections,
plausible sources of real rigidity simplyraise -1122 or lower 1112.10
To understand the connection between x and
it,recallthat nominal
rigidity is an equilibrium if an agent does not adjust his nominalprice to a
nominal shock given that others do not adjust. Asexplained in the introduc-
tion, non-adjustment along with the others implies a constantreal price, and
the others' behavior implies that the nominal shockaffects real aggregate
demand; thus nominal rigidity is an equilibrium if anagent does not adjust
his real price when demand shifts. An increase inreal rigidity means that an
agentdesires a smaller change in his real price aftera given change in
demand.When the desired change is smaller, the cost offorgoing it is
smaller;thus a menu cost is sufficient to preventadjustment for a wider
range of shocks.6
D. The Welfare Losses from Nominal Rigidity
Since real rigidity increases nominalrigidity, it increases the economic
fluctuations resulting from shocks to nominalaggregate demand.Keynesians
believe not only that such fluctuationsare large, but also that they are
6Following Ball arid Romer(1987b), we can compute the range of monetary
shocks for which full adjustment of all prices isan equilibrium as well as
the range for which rigidity is an equilibrium.Adjustment is an equilibrium **** forIxI>x,xr'/2z/(_W22).As our previous paper points out, formany specific models, x cx ——thatis, there is a range of shocks, x <pxIcx*, forwhich both rigidity and flexibility areequilibria. Combining the expres- 11* * ** sionfor xwith (9) yields x /x r i/ri.Thus multiple equilibria require
sufficient real rigidity (mci), and greater realrigidity increases the range
of multiple equilibria. Intuitively, multiple equilibria arise from
"strategic complementarity" in price—setting: anagent's desired nominal price
depends positively on others' prices, and soadjustment by others increases
his incentive to adjust. Real rigidity raisesthe degree of strategic com-
plernentarity --whenagents want stable real prices, their desired nominal
prices are closely tied to others' prices.
.11
highly inefficient --andthus that reducing them through demand stabilization
is highly desirable. We now show that real rigidities strengthenthis view:
greater real rigidity implies greater welfarelosses from equilibrium nominal
rigidity. As we show in the next section, thisresult is important because
the clearest failure of menu cost models without real rigiditiesis an in-
ability to generate fluctuations with significantwelfare costs.
To simplify our welfare analysis, we modify the experimentof the pre-
vious section: following Ball and Romer (1987a), we assumethat an agent must
decide whether to pay the menu cost before he observes the moneysupply. If
the agent pays, he can always adjust his price ex post;if he does not pay,
his price is always rigid. In other words, the degree ofnominal rigidity is
a zero—one variable. As in our earlier paper,this simplification does not
affect the qualitative results.






Comparing (11) with (7) shows that 4:E[01—1)2] replacesx2:(M—1)2 in the ex-
pression for the private cost. In choosingbetween rigidity and flexibility
ex ante, agents compare the menu cost tothe expected private loss from
rigidity, which is increasing in the variance of money.
The welfare loss from equilibrium rigidity depends onthe relation of PC
to the "social cost" of rigidity: the difference betweenE[W()] when all
agents pay the menu cost and when none pays.If no agent pays, then by12
reasoning similar to the derivation of (6), E[W(•)J





If all agents pay the menu coat, then M/P:1 andPj/P:1 (the equilibrium under
flexible prices); thus E[W(•)] r W(1,1). Theseresults imply that the social
cost of rigidity is










(14) R — ________________
PC
(W21)3
Recall that nominal rigidity is an equilibriumas long as the private cost
does not exceed z.This implies that the largest possible socialcost of
equilibrium rigidity is H tines z. Since the losses fromrigidity disappear
whencrrO, Hzisalso the maximum gain from stabilizing nominalaggregate
demand. Thus, for a given menu costz, the welfare cost of rigidity and the
gains from demand stabilization are increasing in H. Asdiscussed in Ball and
Roner(1987a), R can be greater than one --thesocial cost of nominal
rigidity can exceed the private cost -—becauserigidity has a negative exter-
nality.Rigidity in one agent's price contributes torigidity in the ag-
gregate price level. Greater price level rigiditycauses larger fluctuations
in real aggregate demand, which harms allagents.
Thesize of H, like the degree of nominalrigidity, does not depend13
solely on the degree of real rigidity but is linkedto it in important ways.
Consider first an increase in real rigidity caused by an increasein -W22. As
described above, this reduces the private cost of nominal rigidity -—thegain
from adjusting to a shock if others do not adjust.In contrast, the social
cost of nominal rigidity is unaffected (W22 does not appearin the expression
for SC).Intuitively, real rigidity is irrelevant to the differencein wel-
fare when all prices adjust and when none adjusts becauseall real prices are
one in both cases.Thus real rigidity increases the ratio of social to
private costs of nominal rigidity by reducing thedenominator while leaving
the numerator unchanged.
The effect of an increase in real rigidity caused by a decreasein 4112 is
more complicated. A lower 12 like a higher -W22,reduces the private cost
of rigidity. But in principle it can affect the socialcost as well. Nominal
rigidity affects not only the variance of output, as weemphasize, but also
the mean. This follows from the deviation of the pricelevel under stickiness
from the certainty equivalent level (see our 1987a paperfor details). The
effect of rigidity on mean output depends on in a complicated way; as a
result, reducing W12 has in general an ambiguouseffect on R. In the specific
models of this paper, however, the effect of rigidity on meanoutput is unim-
portant. Ignoring this effect, a smaller j2hasthe same implications as a
larger —W22: 11 rises because its denominatorfalls and its numerator is un-
changed.11$
III.A SIMPLE YEOMANFARMERMODEL
This sectionconsiders one example of the class of modelsstudied above:
the "yeoman farmer" model of Ball and Romer(1987a,b). Aside from imperfect
competition and the menu cost, the model's assumptionsare Walrasian. We show
that both the degree of nominalrigidity and the welfare loss from rigidity
are small for plausible parameter values; thusmenu costs are not enough to
produce large real effects of money. The model ofthis section is also the
basis for Sections lY—VI: in each ofthese, we add a specific source of real
rigidity to the model and show that large non—neutralitiescan result.
A. The Model7
The agents in this model are a continuum offarmers indexed by i and dis-
tributed uniformly between i:O and ii. Eachfarmer uses his own labor to
produce a differentiated good, then sells thisproduct and purchases the
products of all other farmers. Farmer i'sutility function is
(15)Ui C ——1LiY
—zDi, c(c—l)/cdjJ"1
where Li is farmer i's labor supply,C is an index of farmer i's consumption,
Cii is farmer i's consumption of the product of farmer j,c is the elasticity
of substitution between any twogoods (c>1), and y measures the extent of in-
creasing marginal disutility of labor ('p1). Thecoefficient on Li is chosen
so that equilibrium output neglecting menu costsis one, as in our general
model.
Tsee Ball and Roiner (1987a)for a more detailed presentation of themodel.15
Farmer I has a linear production function:
(16) Yi Li





(18) 110 Yidi ;
p F11-di]1R1d
P is the price index for consumption, C.
Equations (15)—(18) determine the demandfor farmer i's product:
(19) M)(1)e
Farmer i's consumption equals his real revenues:
pill
(20) —.
substituting(19) and (20) into (15) yields the specificform of w(')inthis
model:
(21) U1 (M)(i)(1s) —c1(M)1(i)YE — zDj
14
EW(,-i-)
B.Are the Non—Neutralities Large?
We can now determine the degree of nominal rigidityand the welfare loss
from rigidity in this model.Taking the appropriate derivativesof (21),
evaluating at (1,1), and substituting into(8) and (14) yields16
(22) /2(1+ic_s)z R (1+cy—c)2
(R >1)
V(c—1)(y—1)2
As in previous papers, a second order menu coat leadsto first order
nominal rigidity (x is proportional to ,i). But this doesnot imply that
menu costs prevent adjustment to sizable shocks (thatis, 1*neednot be
large). Similarly, R is greater than one, but this does notimply that menu
costs cause large welfare losses; since the loss fromequilibrium rigidity is
Rz and z is small,R must bemuch greater than one. We now show that in this
model and R are small for plausible parameter values. The resultsfor R
are more clear-cut than the results for x1.
Table 1 shows the private cost of non—adjustment toa five percent change
in the money supply, measured as a percentage of a farmer'srevenue when all
prices are flexible, for various values of c and The private cost equals
the menu cost needed to prevent adjustment to the shock——thatis, to make
greater than .05. The table also shows the values of Rcorresponding to the
values of c and y. To interpret the results, note thatnon—adjustment to a
five percent change in money implies a fivepercent change in real output.
Recall that s is the elasticity of demand fora farmer's product and y
measures the degree of increasing marginal disutility of labor.The table
presents the private cost and R as functions of 1/(c—1), themarkup of price
over marginal cost, and l/(y—i), farmers' labor supplyelasticity.
8Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)present similar calculations.While the
private cost is measured in units of utility and revenue is measured indol—
lars,itislegitimate to compare them because the marginal utility of income
is always one.17
We focus on a base ease in which, using evidence from empiricalstudies,
we take .15 as the value of the markup and .15 againas the labor supply elas-
ticity; these numbers imply cry:?.?.9 For these values,the private cost of
rigidity is seven tenths of a percent of revenue,which appears non-
negligible.(If the change in money is three rather than five percent,the
private cost is three tenths of a percent ofrevenue.) Thus, while it is dif-
ficult to determine "realistic" values for costs of adjustingnominal prices,
trivial costs would not be sufficient to prevent adjustment inthis example)0
In any case, the welfare result is very clear. When both the markupand the
labor supply elasticity are .15, H is 1.2 --thesocial cost of rigidity is
only slightly greater than the private cost.Since the welfare loss from
rigidity is bounded by Rz, Rr1.2 and small menu costs implythat this loss is
9For evidence on markups, see Scherer (1980); for labor supply elasticities,
see Killingsworth (1983).
10}Iow large are the costs of adjusting prices in actual economies? In many
cases, the cost of physically changing a price(for example, by replacing a
price tag) seem xismall.But the lost convenience of fixing prices in
nominal terms ——thecost of learning to think in real terms, and of computing
thenominal price changes corresponding to desired real price changes ——may
be larger. The costs of adjusting nominal wages appear largerthan the costs
of adjusting prices, especially if adjustment requiresunion—management
negotiations.On the other hand, it appears relatively inexpensive toin-
crease wage flexibility through greater indexation.Finally, ifwe follow
AkerlofandYellenin interpreting the nenu cost as a departure from full
rationality,it seems plausible that these departures involve losses sig-
nificantly greater thanthecost of a price tag.18
small.
Table I shows that it is difficult to reverse these results. Since the
private cost of rigidity is decreasing in both the markup and the labor supply
elasticity, we consider the case in which each is 1.0; this is a generous up-
per bound for both.In this case, the private cost of non—adjustment to a
five percent change in money is .011% of revenue, which is perhaps trivial.
But R:1L5 ——thewelfare cost of the business cycle is still only four and a
half times the menu cost. Only outlandish parameter values yield large values
ofR --forexample, a markup of one and a labor supply elasticity of ten im-
ply Rr72.
Intuitively, the crucial problem for the model is that labor supply ap-
pearsto be inelastic (that is, realistic values of yare large).Since
workersare reluctant to vary their hours of work, they have a strong Incen-
tive to adjust their wages (equal to their product prices in our yeoman farmer
model) when demand changes. Large private gains from flexibility imply that
farmers paythemenu cost after a nominal shock unless the shock is very
small,and thus that only small shocks affect output and welfare.
11Twochangesinthe model would strengthen these results. First, following
Bali andRorer(1987a), we could introduce risk aversion in consumption. As—
stiaingconstantrelative risk aversion utility with a risk aversion coef-
ficient of four(atypical estimate; see for example Mankiw, 1981) raises the
private cost of rigidity to 1.2% of revenue and reduces R to 1.1. Second, by
assiaingself—employment, we have implicitly assumed that labor is immobile.
As we describe in Section VI, introducing labor mobility increases the private
gainsfroe price adjustment.If mobility is perfect, the effects are
dramatic: the private cost of non—adjustment is 38% of revenue and R is 0.015.19
IV. AN AD HOC MODEL OF REAL RIGIDITY
This section presents the first of three examples in which we add a
specific source of real rigidity to the yeoman farmer model.Here, we add
realrigidity as simply as possible by assuming ad hoc that real prices are
costly to change.
A. The Implications of Costs of Adjusting Real Prices.





where k is a non-negative constant. With this change, equation (21) becomes





Equation(23) adds a quadratic cost of adjusting real prices to the fixed cost
of adjusting nominal prices. (Each farmer begins with a real price of one be-
cause Pj:P0rPbeforethe money stock is observed.)Following Rotemberg
(1982), we could interpret k(—1)2 as the cost of upsetting customers through
unstableprices;this cost might be lost sales in a future period that is not20
includedexplicitly in the model.12 Alternatively, we could interpret
Pj
as the cost of violating a social custom about "fair" prices (see
Akerlof, 1980, and Homer, 1984).13






Not surprisingly, the degree of real rigidity is increasing in the cost of ad-
justing real prices, and real prices become completely rigid as the cost ap-
proaches infinity.
To determine the relation between real and nominal rigidity, we sub-




(27) H [(c—1)(1+yc—c) +2k]
c(e—1)(y—1)2
12Rotemberg assumes that customers dislike instability in nominalprices,
and therefore specifies a quadratic cost of adjusting nominal prices. In the
absence of money illusion, however, customers care only about real prices. We
adopt a quadratic functional form because presumably large real price changes
upset customers more than small changes. In contrast, it is realistic to as—
slime that thecost of adjusting a nominal price is fixed: the cost of replac-
ing aprice tag does not depend on the new price.
13Socialcustoms can be modeled more rigorously by assuming that consumers
receive disutility frontpurchasingthe products of unfair sellers. For ex—
ample, product-specific taste shifterscan be added to the utility function,
with the taste shifter for product i depending negatively on —1)2.In
this case, a firm's demand decreases if it charges an unfair price. One can
show that the implications for price rigidity are similar to those of our ad
hoc model.21
Inspectionof (26) and (27) shows that both and R are increasing in k, and
that both approach infinity as k approachesinfinity.Thus increasing real
rigidity by introducing costs of changingreal prices can lead to large
nominal rigidities. In terms of our generalmodel, one can show that increas-
ing k lowers itbyraising -W22 —-makingutility more concave in prices -—
whileleaving W12 unchanged. As shown inSection ii, increasing real rigidity
in this way always produces greaternominal rigidity.
B. Mow Much Real Rigidity is Necessaryl
Section III showed that without costsof changing real prices, plausible
parameter values imply that thereis little nominal rigidity. We nowask how
much real rigidity is needed to reversethis result.Table 2 presents the
private cost of nominal rigidity(again assuming a five percent changein
money) and R for various values ofthe markup, the labor supply elasticity,
and the degree of real rigidity Notethat, given the other parameters,
there is a one-to-one relation between ¶andk; we present results in terms
of because Ic has little economic meaning.Since the results about the size
of R are the most disappointing inSection III, we focus the present discus-
sion on R.
Table 2 shows that a large degreeof real rigidity is necessary for a
large a.Asa benchmark, note first thatif krO --realprices are costless to
change, so the model reducesto the one in Section III ——amarkup of .15 and
a labor supply elasticityof .15 imply it:.127 and (as shownabove) Rrl.2.
Increasingk so thatitfallsto .05 -—thatis, reducing the responsesof
realpricesto demand shifts by more than half —-raisesR to 3.0, but this is22
still small.(n.05 combined with a markup and laborsupply elasticity of
one implies Rr30.) Larger reductions in iTproducebetter results: n.O1 im-
plies 11:15 for a markup and labor supply elasticity of.15 (and 11:150 for a
markup and elasticity of one), and vr:.OO1 implies 11:152 (and 1500).
While these results show that thenecessary amount of real rigidity is
large, they do not determine whether this much rigidity isrealistic. Our ad
hoc model does not tie the degree of realrigidity to parameters of tastes or
technology that we can estimate. The literature on customermarkets, social
customs, and so on suggests that the costs of adjusting realprices may be
large --certainlythere is no presumption that they aretrivial, as with the
costs of adjusting nominal prices. Research has notgone far enough, however,
to produce quantitative estimates of theresulting real rigidity. We return




This section studies a version of ouryeoman farmer model in which real
price rigidity is based on microeconomic foundations. Thesourceof rigidity
isan asymmetry in the effectson demand of price increases and decreases that
hasbeen exploredby Stiglitz (1979, 1984) and Woglom (1982). The centralas—
sumption is thatchanges in a firm's price are observedby the firm's current
customers but not by other consumers. If the firmraises its price, it loses
sales both because some of its customers leave forother sellers and because23
its remaining customers buy less. If thefirm lowers its price, it sells more
to current customers, but it does notattract other firms' customers, because
they do not observe the lower price.
To introduce this asymmetry in demand, we modifyour basic model by as-
suming that each of the goods in the economyis produced by many farmers
rather than by one, and that each farmersells to a group of customers rather
than to everyone.In addition, we introduce heterogeneityin tastes that
causes the proportion of a farmer'scustomers who leave to be a smooth func-
tion of the farmer's price.Thus, while Stiglitz and Woglom studydemand
curveswith kinks, we focus on the more appealing caseof demand curves that
bendsharplybut are nonetheless differentiable at all points.(Kinked demand
curvesare a limiting case of our model; wediscuss the special features of
this case below.)
Part B of this section presents the revisedmodel. Part C derives the
demandcurve facing a farmer and shows thatitis asymmetric. Part D shows
that the asymmetry in demand leads to real pricerigidity. Finally, Part E
demonstrates the link between real and nominal rigidityin this example.
B. Assumptions
There is a continuum of differentiated goods,each produced by a con-
tinuum of farmers. Goods are indexedby j anddistributeduniformly on the
unitinterval; farmers are indexed by j and kand distributed uniformly on the
unit square. We let ir(j,k) denote a pointin the unit square.
Each farmerconsumesall products but purchases a given productfrom only
onefarmer, his "home seller" of that good.A farmer observes the prices of2k
his home sellers. He does not observe other individualprices, but he knows
the distribution of prices for each good.In his role as a seller, each
farmer is the home seller of a continuum of farmers, hiscustomers.Each
producerof good j begins as the home seller of an equalproportion of all
farmers.
Asinour other models, each seller sets a nominal price before observing
themoney stock, and then, after H is revealed, can adjust by paying the menu
cost. After prices are determined, each farmer chooses whether toleave each
of his home sellers for another seller of the sameproduct. For simplicity,
we assume that this search is costless, but that a farmer can search fora
seller of a given product only once: if the farmer leaves his homeseller, he
is assigned to another and can neither search again nor return tohis original
home seller. (Our results would not change if we introduceda search cost and
allowed farmers to choose how many times to search.) Ifa farmer leaves his
homeseller of a given product, he has an equal chance ofbeing assigned to
eachother seller of the product.
We introduce heterogeneity in tastes by modifying theutility function,
(15), to be




D(ij) is a dummy variableequalto one if farmer i remains with his home
seller of product J;eimeasures farmer i's taste for remaining with his
U25
home seller of product j; and A and B areconstants chosen forconvenience.1
The important change in the utility function is theaddition of the 8ij' to
the consumption index.In words, farmer its utility gain from oneunit of
product j provided by his hone seller equalshis gain from units from a
different seller. We can Interpret farmers' tastesfor their home sellers as
arising from location, service, and the like.For simplicity, a farmer is in-
different among all sellers of a given product who arenot his home seller.
We assume that is distributed across i with a cumulative distribution
function, F('), which is the same for all j.We also assume that the mean of
8, is greater than one and that the densityfunction of f('), is
symmetric around 8 and single-peaked. The assumptionthat 8 Is greater than
one means that, all else equal, most buyers preferto remain with their home
sellers. This (plausible) assumption is necessaryfor imperfect information
to lead to asymmetric demand.If 8 had mean one, then half of a farmer's
customers would leave if he charged a real priceof one, and this would imply
that price decreases save as many customers as priceincreases drive away.
Aside from the modifications described here, themodel is the same as in
Section III.





where F() and f() are defined below.26
C.Product Demand
The first step in studying this version of the model is to derive the
demand curve facing an individual seller. We focus on the case in whichall
other sellers in the economy charge a real price ofone; the analysis below
requires only the results for this case.
A farmer sells to two groups of customers: original customers whoremain
with him after they observe his price, and customers of other sellerswho
leave and are assigned to him. An original customer stays if this maximizes
his utility gain per unit of expenditure. The utilityfunction, (28), and the
assumptionthatothers' real prices are one imply that a customer of farmer i
remainsif 15
(30) <e
One canshow thatif a customer stays, his demand for the farmer's product is
(31) (Ae)(t—1)(_) ()





Customersof other sellers of farmer i's product also use the rule in
(30) (with the others' prices replacing to decide whether to leave. Since
we assume that the other sellers charge a real price ofone, their customers
switch if ed;thusthe proportion that leaves is F(1). Our symnetryassuinp-
15More precisely, if farmer i sellsproduct j to farmer i', then farmer i'
remains if <ejj.In the text, we suppress subscripts for simplicity.
I27
tions imply that the new customers assigned to farmer I are proportion F(1) of
his original customers. Finally, the demand from each new customer is given
by (31) with e replaced by one, since eD(ii)i for buyers who switch sellers.
Combining these results, the total demand from new customers is
(33)






Intuitively,h(P1/P) gives the effect of farmer i's price on his number of
customers, and (as usual) (P/P) determines how much each customer buys.
Equation (34) implies asymmetric responses to Increases and decreases in












ris the elasticity of demand evaluated at one, the farmer's ex ante real
price,and p measures the change in the elasticity as the farmer's price
rises around one.p>O implies that price increases have larger effects on
demand than price decreases.A sufficient condition for p>O is f'(l)>O,
whichis guaranteed by ourassumptions that E[e]>1 and that f() isincreas-
ing belowits mean. Iff'(l) is large, then the asymmetry in demand is strong
—-thedemandcurvebends sharply aroundone.28
As in Stiglitz and Woglom, imperfect information is the source of asym-
metric demand. A price increase drives away customers, but a decrease does
not attract new customers, because customers of other sellers do not observe
it. The details of the results are more complicated than in previous papers,
however. Stiglitz and Woglora assume that a firm retains allits customers if
it charges a real price of one, but we assumethat thefirm loses some cus-
tomers (those with Gd).Thusin our model a price decrease does raise the
numberof customers; itdoes not attract new customers, but it saves old cus-
tomerswho otherwise would leave. Demand is still asymmetric, because our as-
sumptionsabout F() imply that the numbersavedis less than the number lost
by an increase.
Figure 1 illustrates the asymmetry in ourmodel.Since farmer i retains
original customers for whomO>Fj/P,the proportion of customers who stay is
given by the area under f()to the right of P1IP.Thechange in this
proportionresulting from a price change is the area under f N)betweenthe
old and new prices. Figure 1 shows that a price increase starting from Ps/P
1 has a larger effect on the proportion who stay than a price decrease, be-
cause f'(l)>l.
There are two limiting cases of our model. The first is f(1):f'(l)rO,
which implies that all customers remain with a farmer if his price is in the
neighborhood of one. In this case, flre, p:O, and the demand function reduces
to (19), the symmetric function in the basic model.Small changes in a
farmer's price do not affect his number of customers, and so price affects
demand only because customers substitute the farmer's product for other goods.
The second case is f(6):O for G<1 and f'(l)n. This implies p-*: the demand29
curve is kinked, as in Stiglitz and Woglon.In this case, all customers
remain as long as Pi/PSi, but a non-negligible proportionleaves as soon as
the price rises above one.
D. Real Rigidity
Substituting the demand equation, (34), into the utilityfunction, (28),






Substituting the appropriate derivatives of w()into the definition of TI
yields
3w li
fll\ - __________ .—<0' -o — , , p—ps
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Accordingto (37), real prices become more rigid as demand becomesmore asym-
metric. As the bend in the demand curve approaches akink (ø÷°), real prices
becomecompletely rigid. Intuitively, a sharplybent demand curve means that
price increasesgreatly reduce demand but decreases raisedemand only a lit-
tle. In this case, both increases and decreases areunattractiveand farmers
maintainrigid prices.
E. Nominal Rigidity
We can now show the connection between real andnominal rigidity in this






Both xtandRareincreasing in p, andbothapproach infinity as p approaches
infinity. Thus increasing realrigidity by bending the demand curve leadsto
greater nominal rigidity, and complete real rigidityarising from kinked
demand implies complete nominal rigidity.16 In terms ofour general model,
* onecan show that increases in p raise x and R because (like increasesin k
in the previous section) they increase-W22 while leaving W12 unchanged --the
bend in the demand curve makes a seller's utilitymore concave in his price.
As in Section III, one can compute the private cost ofnominal rigidity
and R for various parameter values. The mainqualitative result is the same
as before: a large degree of real rigidity isnecessary for a large R. It is
again difficult to determine how much real rigidity isrealistic, because we
do not know realistic values forp, the sharpness of the bend in the demand
16Stiglitz and Woglomargue that kinked demand can lead to nominal rigidity
without referring explicitly to nominal frictions, whichsuggests that real
rigidities alone can cause nominal rigidity. Nominal frictionsare implicit
in the Stiglitz-Woglom argument, however.Neglecting menu costs, kinked
demand curves imply multiple real equilibria——forexample, each firm will
raise its price a small amount if all others do (thisleaves relative prices
unchanged but reduces real money). Crucially, nominal disturbancesdo not af—
feet the set of real equilibria. Stiglitz andWoglom argue informally that
nominal disturbances may move theeconomy from one real equilibrium to another
--forexample, ifnominalmoney falls and prices do not adjust, which is one
equilibrium response, then real money falls. Thisargument depends, however,
on the idea that when there are several equilibriumresponses to a shock, the
one with fixed nominal prices, rather than the one with fixedreal prices, is
"natural." Inturn, this depends on a notion of the convenience offixing prices in nominal terms,which (as we argue in note 10 above) amounts toa
smallcost of nominal flexibility.31
curve.
VI.THE LABOR MARKET AND REAL WAGE RIGIDITY
A. Discussion
Forsimplicity, the models of the previous sections suppress the labor
market and study the implications of real price rigidity arising from product
market imperfections.Traditionally, however, macroeconomists have viewed
labor market imperfections as central to aggregate fluctuations. Motivated by
this view, we now present a model with a labor market in which rigidity in
firms' real prices is caused by rigidity in their real wages.Real wage
rigidity arises from efficiency wageconsiderations.17
The results of previous sections provide two more specific motivations
for this section. First, the small degree of nominal rigidity in our basic
yeoman farmer model arises largely from inelastic labor supply,which gives
farmers strong incentives to stabilize their employment by adjusting prices.
Theanalogue when firms hire workers in a Walrasian labor market is that in-
elasticlabor supply implies highly procyclical real wages -—largewage in-
creases are neededto elicit more work. Highly procyclical real wages imply
hiilyprocyclical marginal costs, which in turn imply strong incentives for
priceadjustment when demand changes.A potentialadvantage of efficiency
17Nominal rigidity still arises in prices but not wages because we do not
introduce nominal frictions in wage setting. If we added such frictions, real
wagerigidity would increase nominal wage rigidity just as real price rigidity
increases nominal price rigidity.32
wage models is that firms set wages above the market clearing level. Since
real wages are not tied directly to labor supply, inelastic laborsupply need
not imply procyclical real wáges.8
A second motivation for this section is the difficulty in earliersec-
tions of determining how much real price rigidity is realistic.This dif-
ficulty reflects uncertainty about the values of key parameters (the cost of
adjustingreal prices andthesharpness of the bend in demand). In this sec-
tion,the degree of real price rigidity is determined by the degree of real
wage rigidity -—theresponsiveness of real wages to demand shifts. We know
something about this parameter; in particular, the acyclicality of real wages
in actual economies suggests that ahigh degree of rigidity is realistic.
Ouranalysis of efficiency wages is tentative because research has not
yetclearly established the implications of efficiency wages for the cyclical
behavior of real wages. In early efficiency wage models, in which workers'
effort depends only on their wages (such as Solow, 1979),wages are completely
acyclical. More recent tshirkingI models (such as Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984)
imply procyclical real wages: when unemployment is high, workers are fearful
of being fired, and so firms can reduce wages without inducingshirking.
Blanchard (1987b) argues, however, that real wages are less procyclical when
181n emphasizing the labormarket, we depart from currently popular mac-
roeconomic theories that focus on the product market.For example, Hall
(1986) argues that the combination of constant marginal cost and imperfect
competition leads to slow adjustment of the economy to shocks. These product
market theories are incomplete because they do not explain how theirassump-
tions are consistent with labor market behavior ——forexample, how marginal
cost can be acyclical despite inelastic labor supply.33
firms pay efficiency wages than in a Walrasian labor market, and Sparks (1986)
presents a modification of the shirking model in which real wages are acycli-
cal. These results appear plausible because, as noted above, efficiency wages
break the link between wages and labor supply that causes highly procyclical
real wages. But at present, the robustness of these results and the size of
the effect of efficiency wages on the cyclicality of real wages are unclear.
In what follows, we simply assume that real wages are substantially less
procyclical --thatis, more rigid in the face of demand fluctuations -—than
in a clearing market.19
B. A Model
We now present an example to illustrate the potential importance of ef-
ficiency wages.2° Since efficiency wages are a labor market phenomenon, a
preliminary step is to modify our basic model by assuming that farmers work
for each other rather than for themselves. For the moment, we assume that the
labor market is Walrasian. Farmers have two sources of income, profits from
their own farms and wages from working for others. Using the production func-
tion, (16), and the product demand equation, (19), one can derive the follow-
191n all efficiency wage models, real wages are rigid in the sense that they
are set above market-clearing levels. This is not, however, the relevant type
of real rigidity. As throughout the paper, large real effects of money re-
quire real rigidity in the sense of small responses to demand shifts.
20Akerlof and Yellen (1985) also present a model that combines a small
nominalfriction ("near—rationality") with efficiency wages.They do not,
however, askhowthe real rigidity resulting from efficiency wages affects the
sizeof the real effects of money. They introduce efficiency wages sothat
nominal shocks affect involuntary unemployment as well as employment and out-
put.34
ing expression for a farmer's utility:
H i (1—c) H i —s c—i
(40) U1 ri+(—)(—) —w(—)(—) — - zDi
where w is the real wage. The first term in (40) is the farmer's labor in-
come; the second (as in the basic model) is the revenue from his farm; the
third is the wage bill he pays; and the fourth is the disutility from the
labor he supplies. Deriving a labor supply function from (40) and combining
it with the production function and our assumption that Y rHIP,we obtain
(41) w ti(M)Y—i CF
Equation (Iii) describes the cyclical behavior of real wages with a Walrasian
labor market. Finally, (40) and (41) lead to the form of W() for this case:
c—i H y t'i -s H i 1—c c—i H y
(42) Wwai r—(—)[1-(—) I +—(----) —
Wenow introduce efficiency wages. We sinply assume that efficiency wage
considerations lead to wages that obey
(43) w -3__(!)4 8>1, 1<4<y CF
Thefunctional form of (43) is chosen for comparability with (41). We can in-
terpret (43) as giving the wage needed to prevent workers from shirking. 8>1
implies that in the vicinity of the no—shock equilibrium, wages are set above
the market—clearing level, and so suppliers of labor are rationed.(For
simplicity, we assume below that B is close to one). Since workers are off
their labor supply curves, the wage is no longer tied to 'f', which determines
the labor supply elasticity.$cy means that wages respond less to demand
shifts than In a Walrasian labor market —-inother words, as in Blanchard the
"noshirking condition" is flatter than the labor supply curve.35
Followingother efficiency wage models, we assume that part of the
rationing of hours of work occurs through unemployment. Specifically,we as-
sume that the division of labor input into workers andhours is given by
(44) Ei
r(LD)a
(45) (L1D)i—a , O<a<1
where Ej is the number of workers hired by farmer i, Hi is hours perworker,
and L0:EHj is the amount of labor the farmer hires. We assumethat workers
are divided between employment and unemployment randomly.(The division of
LiD into Ei and Hi proves irrelevant to the degree of nominal rigidity,
but relevant to the welfare loss from rigidity.)
In this model, w() is a farmer's expected utility given his probability
of employment. Since the size of the labor force is one, this probabilityis
equal to Ei (equation (244)). The farmer's utilityis determined by (40) with
the wage given by (43) and the farmer's labor supply equalto Hj (equation
@5)) when employed and zero when unemployed.Combining these results and




C. Real and Nominal Rigidity
Thesolutions for W(•) in the two models lead to simple expressionsfor
the degree of real price rigidity:
(47) flial y-1; 1TEW$-i.36
Our assumption that real wages are more rigid under efficiencywages, $<y,
implies that real prices are also more rigid. In terms of our general model,
efficiency wages increase real price rigidity by lowering W12 while leaving
W22 unchanged. In this respect the current model differs from our earlier ex-
amples, in which real rigidity arises from a higher -W22.Intuitively, ef-
ficiency wages do not affect W22 because they do not make changes in a firm's
real price more costly. Instead, they reduce the responses of firms' desired
pricesto demand shifts because they reduce the effects of demandon the
determinants of the desired price. Specifically, the desired price ispropor-
tional to marginal cost; since efficiency wages makerealwages less respon-
sive to aggregate demand, they make marginal cost less responsive.
To seethe implications of efficiency wages for nominal rigidity, we cal-
culate x and R for the two models. We assume for simplicity that 8=1 (this
implies that the no—shock level of employment under efficiency wages is close










Theexpression for x is identical to the one for 4al except that
replaces '.Efficiencywages increase nominal rigidity (since 4rcy), and the
degree of nominal rigidity becomes large as the real wage becomes acyclical37
(4, approaches one). The effect of efficiency wages on R is more complex, but
also becomes large as the real wage becomes acyclical.21
As in previous sections, we now ask how much real rigidity is needed for
large non-neutralities. For various parameter values, Table 3 shows the de-
gree of real price rigidity, the private cost of non-adjustmentto a five per-
cent change in money, and the value of R in both the Walrasian and the ef-
ficiency wage model. In contrast to our previous examples, the degree of real
price rigidity is determined by a parameter for which we know plausible
values, and so we can ask whether the amount of real rigidity needed for sub-
stantial nominal rigidity is realistic.
As an empirically plausible base case, we assume that 4:1.1 ——realwages
are only slightly procyclical under efficiency wages --andar.5 --variations
inlabor are divided equally between hours and employment.22 We assume as
21While REW is much larger than Rwal for plausible parameter values (see
below), RWal is larger for some parameter values. This ambiguity arises be-
cause movingfrom the Walrasian to the efficiency wage model reduces -W11,
which implies smaller social costs of rigidity, as well as reducing W12. In-
tuitively, rigidity is less costly under efficiency wages because the result-
ingoutput fluctuations arise partly from fluctuations in employment; in the
Wairasian model, fluctuations arise entirely fromchanges in hours per worker.
Fluctuationsin employment imply fluctuations in each individual's probability
of employment, which arecostlesson average because expected utility is
linear in this probability.Fluctuations in hours are costly because utility
is concave in hours.
22Estimates of the cyclical behavior of real wages vary, but many studies
findthat real wages are approximately acyclical (for example, Geary and Ken-
nan,1982). The choice of a:1/2 is based on the common finding (for example,
Barsky and Miron, 1987) that at business cycle frequencies the elasticityof
output with respect to employment is roughly two and the elasticitywith
respect to total manhours is roughly one.38
above that the markup and labor supply elasticity are both .15.For these
parameter values, the introduction of efficiency wages has dramatic effects.
In a Wairasian labor market, the private cost ofrigidity is a huge 38% of
revenue, and R is a tiny .02.23 But with efficiency wages, the private cost
is less than one hundredth of a percent and H is 33. As inour other models,
substantial nominal rigidity requires substantial realprice rigidity ——in
our base case, introducing efficiency wages reduces u from 6.7 to .1. Butin
this model, it is clear that this much real rigiditycan arise from plausible
underlying assumptions ——inparticular, the assumption that real wages
respond little to aggregate demand.
There are two caveats concerning these results. First, the valueof R is
quite sensitive to moderate changes in parameter values -—forexample, if $
is raised from 1.1 to 1.5, H drops from 33 to 1.4.Second, and most impor—
23Note that nominal pricesare much more flexible with a Walrasian labor
market than in the self—employment model of Section III-—theprivate cost of
rigidity is much larger and H is much smaller.These results reflect the
greater flexibility of real prices in the Walrasian model: forour base case,
1rr6.7 for the Walrasian model and ITr.13 withself—employment.Intuitively,
the private gains from price adjustment arelarge with a Walrasian labor
market because when output falls (for example) the realwage is low. Since a
producer can hire as much labor as he wants at thiswage, he can greatly in-
crease profits by cutting his price and increasing output.With self—
employment, the gains from increasing output aresmallerbecause a producer
faceshis own upward—sloping labor supply curve.This difference in incen-
tives to adjust is very large if,as we assume, labor supply is inelastic: in thiscase,when output is low a producer faces avery low real wage ina Wal—
rasian market but very steep labor supply underself-employment,Finally,
note that E:.02 implies that, with a Walrasian labormarket, the private gains
from adjustment are much greater than the socialgains. While an individual
producer can greatly increase profits by cutting his price when thereal wage
is low, society cannot realize similar gains: if allsellers cut their prices,
then output rises and the real wage rises, whichgreatly reduces each seller's
gain from adjustment.39
tant,whilewe have tied the degree of real rigidity to a parameterfor which
we know plausible values -—thecyclical sensitivity of real wages ——itis a
parameterof aggregate economic behavior,not anicroeconomie parameter of
tastes or technology. We have not determined whether reasonablemicroeconomic
assumptions can produce the assumed real wage behavior giventhe rest of our
model. This reflects the fact that research has not completelydetermined how
efficiency wages affect the cyclicality of real wages,and highlights the im-
portance of future work on this issue. Ourresults simply show that if ef-
ficiency wages greatly reduce the responsivenessof real wages to demand, then
they explain large nominal rigidities.
VII.CONCLUSIONS
Rigidities in real wages and prices are notsufficient to explain real
effects of nominal disturbances. In the absence of nominal frictions,prices
adjust fully to nominal shocks regardless ofthe degree of real rigidity.
Small costs of adjusting nominal prices are also not enoughto explain impor-
tant non—neutralities.With no real rigidities, these frictions cannot
prevent adjustment to sizable nominalshocks or cause nominal fluctuations to
havelarge welfare effects. This paper shows, however,that the combination
of substantial real rigidity and small costs of nominal flexibilitycan lead
to large real effects of money.
To review the explanation for this result, non—adjustmentof prices to a
nominal disturbance is an equilibrium when no price setterwants to adjust his
price if others do not adjust.But non—adjustment to a nominal shock when40
others' prices are fixed implies non—adjustment of a real price to a change in
real demand. Real rigidity meansthat aprice setter desires only a small
price change when demand shifts. In the absence of nominal frictions, a small
desired change implies thatnon—adjustmentis not an equilibrium. But since
the cost of forgoing a small adjustment is small, a small "menu cost" is suf-
ficient to make rigidity an equilibrium.24
We demonstrate the connection between real and nominal rigidity ina
general class of models of imperfectly competitive price setters.In ad-
dition, we present models in which real rigidities arise from three specific
sources: an ad hoc cost of changing real prices, imperfect information and
customer markets, and efficiency wages. For each model, we find that a large
degree of nominal rigidity arises only if the degree of real rigidity is
large. We do not fully resolve whether the necessary amount of real rigidity
is realistic. This requires development of models of real rigidities in which
the degree of rigidity is derived from microeconomic parameters for which we
know plausible values.
Strengthening the foundations of Keynesian economics requires further
research into real rigidities. The point of this paper is that, along with
small nominal frictions, real rigidities can lead to large nominal rigidities.
Thus as we develop better explanations for real rigidities, we gain better ex-
24Thus, for example, Keynes's argument that workers'concern for relative
wages can lead to nominal wage rigidity is correct if amended slightly. Con-
cern for relative wages is likely to reduce but not completely eliminate a
firm's desired adjustment to a nominal shock. Keynes is correct if there is a
small cost to prevent firms from making small adjustments.41
planations for nominal rigidities as well.42
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TABLE I —SimpleYeoman FarmerModel






Note: Private Cost is for a five percent change in money. Private Cost is
























.06 /2.67 .04 / '1.50#6
TABLE II -AdHoc Model
Private Cost / R

















Real Rigidity when k:0
Note: Private Cost is for a
measured as a percentage of
five percent change in revenue. Private Cost is
revenue when prices are flexible.
.127* .71 I1.19 .115* .10 / 1.117
.050 .28 / 3.04 .050 .04 / 3.37
.025 .14 / 6.09 .025 .02 / 6.75
.010 .06 /15.2 .010 .01 / 16.9
.005 .03 / 30.4 .005 .00 / 33.7
.002 .01 / 76.1 .002 .00 / 84.3
.001 .01 / 152.1 .001 .00 / 168.6
1174* .39 / 2.31 333* .04 / 11.50
.200 .17 / 5.37 .200 .03 / 7.50
.050 .04 / 21.5 .050 .01 / 30.0
.025 .02 / 43.0 .025 .00 / 60.0
.010 .01 / 107.5 .010 .00 / 150.0
.005 .00 / 214.9 .005 .00 / 300.0
.002 .00 / 537.3 .002 .00 / 750.0
*47
TABLE III —EfficiencyWage Model
1/(y—1):1/(c—1)r.15 l/(y—l)=1/(c—1):1.O0
a:.50 a:.50
Pc R iT PC R
Wal -———6.7037.60 .02 Wa].——-1.00.13 1.50
EW 2.00 1.00 .84 .40 ElI 2.00 1.00.13 1.44
1.50 .50 .21 1.44 1.50 .50 .03 4.50
1.10 .10 .0132.93 1.10 .10 .00 87.50
1.05 .05.00 130.19 1.05 .05 .00337.50
1/('y—1)=1/(e1):.15
arO a:1.0O
$ iT PC B $ PC R
Wal ————6.7037.60 .02 Wal--—6.7037.60 .02
ElI2.00 1.00 .84 .91 EW 2.00 1.00.84 .26
1.50 .50 .21 3.60 1.50.50 .21 .79
1.10 .10 .0189.15 1.10.10 .01 114.56
1.05 .05.00 356.19 1.05.05.00 55.60
Note: Private Cost is for a five percent change in revenue. Private Cost is










ETM1R I -ImperfectInfrmation Model
Asymmetric Effects of Price Changes
f(6)
U
U)CU
cc
C-)
Wo>cW(n
N
1 9